










In this paper I will discuss whether, for theoretical purposes, the concept of truth should be replaced 
by some other concept – still a broadly truth-like concept, but distinct from the ordinary concept of 
truth. I will first make some general remarks on this issue. Then, later, I will discuss the question as it 
arises specifically in connection with the kind of inconsistency theory of truth that I and a number of 
other theorists have defended in face of the semantic paradoxes. 
 
2. 
David Chalmers (2011) forcefully stresses what seems to me to be a good and important point 
concerning philosophical methodology: while philosophers often have been concerned with our 
actual concepts or the properties or relations they stand for, philosophers should also be asking 
themselves whether these really are the best tools for understanding the relevant aspects of reality, 
and in many cases consider what preferable replacements might be. Philosophers should be engaged 
in conceptual engineering.1 Compare: when physicists study reality they do not hold on to the concepts of 
folk physics but use concepts better suited to their theoretical purposes. Why should things stand 
differently with what philosophers study? It would be Panglossian to suppose that the concepts we 
find ourselves with are the ones that are best suited to the purposes in question. In this paper, I 
discuss this general point as it applies to the case of truth. 
 One possible route to go when doing conceptual engineering would be to simply get rid of 
all concepts of a particular kind. In the case of truth there is the possibility of (like some logical 
positivists at a certain point) urging not only that we get rid of the ordinary concept of truth but also, 
more generally, that we ought not to employ any truth-like concepts at all. However, in this paper, I 
will not discuss that kind of radical stance. I will assume the legitimacy of truth-like concepts. The 
                                                      
* Many thanks to Alexis Burgess, Colin Johnston, David Liggins, Kevin Scharp and Bret Sherman for helpful 
comments on an earlier version. 
1 Chalmers does not himself use the locution “conceptual engineering”. I take that locution from Blackburn 
(1999). 
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question is whether there might be a case for replacing the concept of truth by some other truth-like 
concept.2 
 One natural, albeit vague, source of unease with the general idea of conceptual engineering 
in philosophy is that the concepts that are at the center of philosophical disputes – truth, knowledge, 
justification, rightness,… – are in some way basic or fundamental, in such a way that one cannot very 
well replace them. I am doubt if there is a way to make good on this general sense of unease. At any 
rate, I will not discuss this general worry. Instead I will discuss some problems specific to the case of 
truth. Given facts specific to the case of truth, the case for replacing it is somewhat problematic. I 
will not attempt to survey all theoretical projects for which one might want to replace the concept of 
truth, or all views on the role of the concept of truth. Instead I will discuss some prominent projects 
and views and discuss the problems that arise in those contexts. 
 A number of theorists, including myself, hold that the liar paradox and related semantic 
paradoxes show the ordinary concept of truth to be in some sense inconsistent.3 It is natural to think 
that if any version of the inconsistency view we defend is correct, then the ordinary concept of truth 
ought to be replaced by some sanitized counterpart, at least in theoretical contexts. I will critically 
discuss this thought later. But many of the considerations I will bring up in the paper are 
independent of the fate of the inconsistency view. 
 What might be an example of a truth-like concept that could serve to replace the ordinary 
concept of truth? If we look at the liar literature, we can find some concrete suggestions. To take a 
historically important example, Tarski’s (1935) hierarchy of truth predicates was meant to serve as a 
replacement for the ordinary concept of truth, which Tarski deemed to be inconsistent.4 Moreover, 
in the contemporary literature one finds a whole variety of theories – versions of Kripke’s theory, 
various revision theories, various paraconsistent theories, etc.5 All of these theories describe possible 
                                                      
2 What conditions must a concept satisfy to count as truth-like? How similar to the ordinary concept of truth 
must it be, and how is similarity to be understood here? These are certainly reasonable questions, but I will not 
pause to answer them. I think it should be clear that the proposed replacements I go on to talk about satisfy 
any such conditions.  
3 See, e.g., Azzouni (2006, 2007), Burgess & Burgess (2011), Eklund (2002), Johnston (forthcoming), Ludwig 
(2002), Patterson (2007, 2008, 2009), and Scharp (2007, 2008, 2013a, 2013b). 
4 See Tarski (1935). The formulation in the text slides over an issue orthogonal to present concerns but 
important in the bigger picture. What Tarski deemed inconsistent was not specifically the concept of truth but 
natural language. Natural language is inconsistent, Tarski held, because of how the truth predicate works together 
with facts about what logic it obeys and what expressive resources it has. Tarski’s preferred cure involved 
replacing the truth predicate with a hierarchy of truth predicates, and this is why it is natural to single out truth, 
but strictly it is wrong to say that Tarski held truth to be inconsistent. The same point applies generally to the 
inconsistency views discussed here.  
5 For just a small sampling of some important theories on offer, see, e.g., Field (2008), Gupta and Belnap 
(1993), Maudlin (2004), McGee (1991), Priest (2006), and the essays collected in Martin (1984). 
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concepts of truth, even if at most one of them can successfully describe the ordinary concept.6 
Whichever ones of these theories fail to describe the ordinary concept describe possible replacement 
concepts. Here is a general way to look at the liar paradox literature since Tarski. Tarski proved an 
impossibility theorem, showing that there cannot be a language simultaneously satisfying a number of 
natural desiderata: having a truth predicate that obeys the standard truth rules (the ascending rule from 
p to infer ‘p’ is true and the descending rule from ‘p’ is true to infer p), being classical, and being able to 
speak of its own syntax. Much of the formal literature since then serves to map out various ways of 
attempting to approximate satisfying these desiderata. Even completed, that map still leaves open 
two types of questions. One concerns what conditions our language, and its truth predicate, satisfies. 
Another concerns what conditions a language, and its truth predicate, should satisfy in order to be 
ideal for such-and-such a theoretical purpose.7 
 The above paragraph also indicates what types of alternatives to the ordinary concept of 
truth I will consider in my discussion: alternative truth-like concepts that differ in that they obey 
different logical principles. Obviously one can also imagine comparing truth-like concepts that differ 
also along other dimensions. For example, one might look at the debates over truth in the more 
metaphysics-oriented literature and conclude that there are correspondence concepts of truth, 
coherence concepts of truth, epistemic concepts of truth, deflationist concepts of truth, etc., and 




In this section I will start problematizing the project of replacing the concept of truth for theoretical 
purposes. Take the following, relatively standard justification of truth-theoretic semantics. People 
have tacit knowledge of the referents of words. They know facts such as that “Newt Gingrich” refers 
to Newt Gingrich, “dog” refers to dogs, etc. They know the syntactic structure of sentences, and they 
know the composition rules corresponding to the syntactic structures. This lexical and compositional 
knowledge allows them to grasp the truth-conditions of sentences they hear, and express 
propositions they want to express. Truth-conditional semantics states what speakers have tacit 
knowledge of, and thus provides a psychological explanation of how our knowledge of language 
allows us to gather information about the world, and communicate it as well. This helps provide a 
generally successful account of linguistic activity – successful as evidenced by the advances in the 
                                                      
6 Well, one possibility is that the ordinary concept is indeterminate in such a way that there are different best 
theories of its behavior. Then several of the theories currently on offer may be among those ”best theories”. 
7 A nearby question concerns what conditions the logical expressions of a language must meet in order for the 
language to be ideal for such-and-such theoretical purposes. I will however do my best to suppress this 
question, in an attempt to have fewer moving parts. 
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relevant parts of linguistics and philosophy of language. For future reference, call this kind of 
justification for the use of truth in semantics a cognitivist justification. The cognitivist can be seen as 
treating semantics as a branch of psychology.8 
If this is how the project of truth-theoretic semantics is motivated, then what justifies the 
employment of the concept of truth in semantics is that speakers have tacit knowledge of contents 
involving this concept. The concept of truth employed in semantics must be the concept of truth 
that occurs in the contents that speakers have tacit knowledge of. Speakers must have this concept of 
truth. Given the cognitivist justification for theoretical employment of the truth predicate, there is 
then a problem for the idea that the ordinary concept of truth ought to be replaced for theoretical 
purposes. This justification demands that the concept of truth used in truth-theoretic semantics be a 
concept speakers already have. This might seem to immediately doom the replacement idea, for it 
might seem as if this immediately demands that it be the ordinary concept of truth that is used in 
truth-theoretic semantics. But there are some complications. For example, it may be that we have 
one concept of truth that is lexicalized in ordinary language and that is employed consciously in 
thought and another one, drawn upon in semantic processing, of which our grasp is normally only 
tacit. In this scenario, one can consistently endorse both the cognitivist justification for truth-
theoretic semantics and some version of the replacement idea. The idea would be that what justifies 
using a replacement concept rather than the ordinary concept of truth in truth-theoretic semantics 
are considerations to the effect that the concept we tacitly use is not the ordinary concept of truth 
but some other one. Anyone who embraces this idea would need to provide arguments to the effect 
that the ordinary concept of truth and the tacitly used concept differ in relevant respects. Of course 
since we already have the tacitly used concept there is a sense in which capturing it would not strictly 
be a replacement strategy. But still, the project would be one of finding a concept that better suits the 
theoretical purposes at hand than the ordinary, lexicalized concept does. 
One reaction to the problem noted is to say that when the truth-theoretic semanticist 
ascribes tacit knowledge of truth theories to ordinary speakers, this must be understood in the right 
way: no psychological realism is assumed, instead all that is meant is that the ascriptions fit speakers’ 
dispositions to behavior. Given this more deflationary understanding of the ascriptions of tacit 
knowledge, one can ascribe to speakers a concept of truth they would find foreign, such as a given 
replacement concept of truth. Moreover, a natural objection to the cognitivist conception is that it is 
psychologically implausible. Do really all language users, including, for example, very young children, 
possess a concept of truth? If no psychological realism is assumed, this objection does not arise.  So 
there may be reasons to go this alternative route. However, if the truth-theoretic semanticist takes 
                                                      
8 See, e.g., Larson and Segal (1995), Pietroski (2000), and Stanley (2005). 
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this route, she abandons the cognitivist justification of truth-theoretic semantics. This justification 
crucially relies on a psychologically realist understanding of what is going on. 
 
4. 
To stress, all I have done in the previous section is to display the problems relating to the project of 
replacing the concept of truth given one kind of justification of truth-theoretic semantics, the 
cognitivist justification. Let me briefly provide an account of an outlook better suited to the 
replacement project. It is easier to justify replacing the concept of truth given a deflationary 
understanding of the use of a truth predicate in a theory of meaning. Take, to consider a worked 
example, the deflationary understanding of the use of a truth predicate in a Davidsonian theory, such 
as expounded in Williams (1999). Here is Williams’ understanding of Davidson.9 The core of 
Davidson’s view is his theory of interpretation. This theory of interpretation serves to set up a one-
one correspondence between sentences of the home language and sentences of the target language. 
But how do we best give expression to such facts? If we allowed ourselves ‘means that’ then we 
could express this correspondence using sentences like 
 
“Le President de France est fou” means that the President of France is mad. 
 
But Davidson famously argued against the use of “means that”, and wants instead just to use the 
material biconditionals. However, 
 
“Le President de France est fou” if and only if the President of France is mad. 
 
is not even grammatically well-formed. We need a proper sentence on the left hand side. The reason 
we append a truth predicate to the name of the target sentence is simply that we need to have a 
sentence on the left hand side, and a sentence that stands in the right sort of equivalence relation to 
the target language sentence.  
 The overall point is that the truth predicate here is not necessarily constrained to be the 
ordinary truth predicate, or any predicate expressing a concept that the speakers of the language 
described need have any inkling of. All that the deflationist is looking for is a predicate that performs 
a certain expressive role. Maybe the ordinary truth predicate does that job. But it could be that a 
predicate different from the truth predicate is better suited to play this role. How is one way that it 
might be so. What the deflationist is looking for, ideally, is a predicate that obeys the standard rules 
for truth. We know that there cannot, in a classical setting, be such a predicate. So the deflationist 
                                                      
9 The discussion to follow in this paragraph follows Williams’ discussion quite closely. 
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will have to settle for what best approximates this ideal. This can be a predicate different from the 




The cognitivist justification relates to the explanatory role of the concept of truth in a psychological 
explanation of our linguistic activity. Here is a different kind of theoretical project: giving a 
theoretical account of how our language represents the world. Even if truth and reference don’t play 
the role in psychological explanation envisaged by the cognitivist justification, one can think that surely 
representational word-world relations do obtain, and we want truth and reference concepts to 
express these relations. Maybe a replacement concept can be an improvement over the ordinary 
concept when it comes to this theoretical purpose. 
But one problem here concerns making a case regarding what an improved replacement 
concept used in such a theoretical account ought to be like? One possible thought here might be that 
a representational concept of truth is to be explained by appeal to the notion, made famous by 
Kripke, of a grounded sentence. A sentence which doesn’t assert anything about the truth-values of 
other sentences is grounded, and one which does assert something about truth-values of other 
sentences is grounded if the process of tracing through what sentences its truth-value depends on 
terminates at grounded sentences.10 One suggestion might be that if we use ‘true’ to serve a 
representational role, then we should say that only grounded sentences are true.11 One prominent 
theory with this consequence is the Kripkean minimal fixed point theory.12 The idea that only 
grounded sentences are true is known to have counterintuitive consequences, as discussed by 
commentators on Kripke.13 Take a sentence that says of itself that it isn’t both true and untrue. 
Intuitively, such a sentence is true. But it isn’t grounded. However, such worries about 
counterintuitiveness seem less germane if the minimal fixed point theory isn’t supposed to capture 
the ordinary concept of truth but instead is supposed to characterize a new, technical concept. Our 
intuition that the sentence in question is true doesn’t speak to whether the sentence is true in the 
relevant technical sense of ‘true’.  
So one cannot straightforwardly argue against the Kripkean minimal fixed point theory – 
conceived of as a theory of what an improved concept of truth is like – based on this intuition. How, 
                                                      
10 See Kripke (1975), p. 693f. 
11 Maudlin (2004), ch. 2, can be seen as arguing the point that focusing on representation has this upshot – 
although Maudlin does not present his discussion as concerning a special concept of truth designed to be used 
for certain theoretical purposes. 
12 See Kripke (1975). 
13 See Gupta (1982), pp. 33ff. 
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then, can one decide between that theory and possible rivals? One problem we run up against here 
has to do with the fact that the concept we are considering replacing is, in some way, a very basic 
concept. What we are considering is the possibility of some concept C of representing the world correctly 
such that C is distinct from the ordinary concept of truth and somehow better captures the idea of 
correct representation of the world than the concept of truth does. One may easily be skeptical of the 
project, wondering what independent grasp we have of correct representation such that correct 
representation can be held to come apart from truth.14 
 
6. 
Let me turn now to a slightly different issue. As mentioned early on, some theorists, including myself, 
think that the proper lesson to draw from the semantic paradoxes is that the ordinary concept is in 
some way inconsistent. In this and the next section I will discuss the question of the replacement of 
truth from the perspective of inconsistency views on truth. Part of the reason is that I think such a 
view is correct and I want to explore its consequences. But the main reason is this. The claim that the 
concept of truth is inconsistent rather immediately invites questions of whether it ought to be 
replaced, and the question of replacement has already given rise to interesting discussion in this 
context. While the discussion to follow most immediately concerns the consequences of the 
inconsistency view, the issues raised are, as I will emphasize, broader. 
The literature abounds with different purported solutions to the liar paradox, but each of 
them in turn has radically counterintuitive consequences – and not just counterintuitive 
consequences but consequences that seem to be at odds with what we arrive at by reflection on the 
meanings of the key expressions involved. One may naturally suspect that the same will be true of 
any purported solution. Such suspicions provide motivation to adopt an inconsistency view on the 
semantic paradoxes. An inconsistency view says that when we go through the paradoxical reasoning 
we correctly follow the rules for the key expressions, the truth predicate and the logical expressions. 
Most straightforwardly, we may think of the rules for ‘true’ as being the standard truth rules, and the 
rules for the logical expressions as being the classical logical principles. Of course the real story may 
be more complicated than this. 
                                                      
14 There is a way that correct representation might come apart from truth. If one is a certain kind of “pluralist” 
about truth – see e.g. Lynch (2009) – then one can think that statements made in some discourses are apt for 
correspondence truth whereas statements made in other discourses are merely apt for deflationary truth or 
truth in the sense of a coherence theory. One can conjoin this with the idea that only correspondence truth is 
properly representational. But whatever the proper fate of this pluralism, this doesn’t speak to whether a 
concept of truth designed to capture the idea of correct representation might obey different logical principles 
from those obeyed by the ordinary concept of truth. 
 I ought perhaps to add that anyone who embraces an inconsistency view on truth of the kind I 
mentioned earlier, and will go on to discuss, will find it natural to equally embrace an inconsistency view on the 
concept of correct representation. 
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One possible virtue of an inconsistency view is that it explains the appearance that the liar 
paradox simply lacks a solution: that whatever purported solution we come up with has absolutely 
unacceptable consequences. The inconsistency view’s explanation is that whatever we say, we end up 
in violation of some constitutive rules. (I wouldn’t put any theoretical weight on the following way of 
describing the situation, but it is evocative: think of using a term with a particular meaning as taking 
on certain semantic obligations – obligations regarding how to use the term. When a language is 
inconsistent, the semantic obligations speakers take on are inconsistent. There will then be certain 
situations where whatever the speaker tries to say, she will end up violating some semantic 
obligation.15) 
A complication regarding inconsistency views is that the inconsistency should be seen as the 
joint inconsistency of the principles governing the concept of truth with other principles, for example 
those governing logical concepts: it is not the concept of truth taken individually that is inconsistent. 
Despite this real complication, I will continue to speak of inconsistency theories of truth. The reason 
is that truth still tends to be singled out for special treatment. Somehow truth is still seen as the main 
culprit. 
An immediate question about any inconsistency theory of the kind described concerns what 
the talk of ‘rules’ amounts to. Certainly I myself think of such talk as merely informal, and I think it is 
important that it be cashed out. There are different possible ways to cash out the talk of rules.  
One view on how to cash out the talk of rules is: a concept is inconsistent if and only if 
competence with it requires being disposed to accept inconsistent claims involving the concept. (Call 
the kind of view I have described the dispositions view.) Another possible view is that a concept is 
inconsistent if and only if competence with it requires actually having inconsistent beliefs involving 
the concept. (Call this the belief view.) A third type of view explains competence in normative terms. 
Scharp (2007) operates with a notion of entitlement. The rules governing a concept are what 
competence with the concept entitles a speaker to accept. An inconsistent concept is one such that 
the speaker’s competence with the concept entitles her to accept inconsistent claims. The entitlement 
is, as Scharp stresses, defeasible. It can for example get defeated by the realization that the claims 
jointly lead to contradiction. (Call this the normative view.) Finally, Burgess and Burgess (2011) say that 
there can be no principled objection to talk of semantic rules given that “linguists have been freely 
positing them in syntax and phonology ever since the downfall of behaviorism”.16 This is most 
                                                      
15 One virtue of this way of putting it (though again I wouldn’t put any weight on it) is that it helps characterize 
what distinguishes the general kind of inconsistency view here discussed from dialetheism – the view that there 
are true contradictions – which also could be regarded as a kind of inconsistency view. Dialetheism doesn’t 
immediately yield that there is no way that a speaker can satisfy her semantic obligations. It  only yields that 
sometimes doing so involves accepting both a sentence and its negation as true. 
16 Burgess and Burgess (2011), p. 133. 
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immediately relevant to the issue at hand if the semantic rules are held to be properly analogous to 
the rules linguists postulate in syntax and phonology. The suggestion then seems to be that the 
linguistic rules are the principles the mind uses in semantic processing.  (To provide a label, let us call 
this the psychological view.)17 
My own favored view is the dispositions view. An immediate objection to this kind of 
suggestion is that experts can lose any disposition to accept the assumptions that jointly lead to 
paradox – simply by being keenly aware that these assumptions jointly lead to paradox – and still the 
expert obviously doesn’t lose competence.18 For future reference, call this the experts objection. This 
objection can be raised, in different form, also against the belief view and the psychological view. In 
response to this objection it can be said that an expert like that is still in a different situation from 
someone who just flatly refuses to accept one or more of the assumptions, without being able to, or 
inclined to, provide a reason – the assumption simply doesn’t strike her as correct. The expert, by 
contrast, can provide reasons for refusing to accept the assumption. It is because of this difference 
that the expert is still competent, while the person who just flatly denies one of the assumptions lacks 
full competence.19 One can add this to the talk of dispositions (or the talk of beliefs or psychological 
processing, if one prefers one of those other views) to get this result.20 Another response is to appeal 
to the linguistic environment. One can respond to the experts objection by saying that if indeed the 
experts still employ the concept of truth with its ordinary content despite their dispositions having 
changed, they do so only by virtue of deference facts – or generally facts about the speaker’s 
linguistic environment and the speaker’s relations to her linguistic environment. The experts 
objection arises in a different way for the normative view: an expert loses her entitlement to the 
principles in question but still remains competent. Perhaps the quickest way for the friend of the 
normative view to deal with this objection is to identify competence with some sort of prima facie 
entitlement rather than entitlement simpliciter. 
 Another immediate question regarding the viability of an inconsistency view concerns 
whether not an inconsistency view implies – seemingly absurdly – either that every sentence of our 
language is true (for they all follow from the rules) or that none is true (for ‘true’ is incoherent and 
nothing falls under an incoherent predicate).  Now, saying that the rules governing the truth 
predicate are inconsistent is not by itself to say anything about the semantic value of the truth 
                                                      
17 Johnston (forthcoming) has a very different kind of view, one on which the rules are rules for the property of 
being true and are not primarily associated with the truth predicate or the concept of truth. 
18 See especially ch. 4 of Williamson (2007) where this objection is developed the most fully. 
19 About “full competence”.  The contrast is with someone who uses a word (concept) with its ordinary 
meaning (content), but not by virtue of her competence alone but by virtue of standing in deference relations 
to other speakers or thinkers. 
20 I am not here primarily concerned to defend my preferred view. Obviously there is much more to be said in 
a full response to the objection. My main purpose here is just to indicate what type of view I prefer, and what 
types of considerations might be marshaled in its defense. 
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predicate, and inconsistency theorists can and do say very different things about this. Some 
inconsistency theorists – the radical ones – do hold that the inconsistency of the concept of truth has 
very radical consequences: that the truth predicate lacks a semantic value, or is empty, or that every 
sentence of our language is true. Some radical inconsistent theorists are Azzouni (2006, 2007) and 
Patterson (2007, 2008, 2009). These theorists try to explain away the seeming absurdity of the 
conclusion. I am myself more moderate, where to be moderate is to hold that even if the concept of 
truth is inconsistent, the semantic value of the truth predicate is not trivial or degenerate. Some other 
inconsistency theorists who take a moderate line are Johnston (forthcoming) and Scharp (2007, 
2013a, 2013b). Here is my preferred way of defending the moderate line. Distinguish between the 
rules governing an expression (e.g. the introduction and elimination rules for ‘and’) and the semantic 
value of that expression (e.g. the truth function that ‘and’ expresses). It is standardly held that if some 
rules are meaning-constitutive for an expression, then the semantic value of an expression is such as 
to make the rules true and truth-preserving. For example, given that the standard rules for 
conjunction are the rules for ‘and’, the semantic value of ‘and’ is what makes these rules correct. This 
is the standard semantic value for ‘and’, which renders these rules truth-preserving. If we apply this 
picture wholesale then we shall have to say that ‘true’ fails to have a semantic value: for no semantic 
value can render the rules for ‘true’ correct. But there is a possible straightforward revision. Compare 
David Lewis’s well-known view on the reference of theoretical terms.21 Lewis (following Carnap) 
held theoretical terms to be implicitly defined by the theories in which they occur. In the simplest 
case, the referent of a theoretical term is whatever makes true the sentences of the theory wherein the 
term occurs. But we certainly want to say that theoretical terms occurring in false theories can refer, 
so we can’t always say exactly that. Lewis’ solution is to allow that the term refers to what comes 
closest to making true those sentences of the theory. Closeness here is not just a matter of what, 
quantitatively, makes true the most sentences. Overall best fit is what is at issue; qualitative 
considerations enter in as well. And if it turned out that a given theory was inconsistent, the same 
would apply. We might still want to allow that theoretical terms introduced by the theory refer, and 
we can get to say this in the same way as in the case of an, as it were, merely false theory. It may be 
obvious where I am going with this: the relationship between the semantic value of ‘true’ (and of the 
logical expressions) and the rules which govern them is the same as that between the semantic value 
of a theoretical term introduced by an inconsistent theory and the sentences of that theory. The 
semantic values of the expressions employed in the liar reasoning are then not such as to make all 
premises in the reasoning true and all steps truth-preserving. While the rules, or meaning-constitutive 
principles, are inconsistent, the actual truth conditions are not. So somewhere in the liar reasoning there 
                                                      
21 See e.g. Lewis (1970), (1972) and (1997). 
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is an untrue premise or a non-truth-preserving step. One thing I would add, however, is that it is 
likely, on the picture sketched, that it will be indeterminate what the semantic value of the truth 
predicate is, and what the semantic values of the logical expressions are. This is because it is 
reasonable to speculate that there will be no unique assignment of semantic values that comes closest 
to being ideal.22  
 
7. 
The above summarizes what, in general, an inconsistency view on the semantic paradoxes of the kind 
I want to focus on is, and also what my favored version of such a view is. Given an inconsistency 
view, the question naturally arises whether our actual concept of truth ought to be replaced. A first 
point to make is that there is no reason to think that an inconsistency theory has to entail that the 
concept of truth is not good enough for everyday purposes. First, most straightforwardly, it is plain 
that employment of the concept works well enough for everyday purposes. If any version of the 
inconsistency view contradicted this, that would be a good reason to abandon the view. Second, with 
the exception of the belief view, none of the versions of the inconsistency view that I have outlined 
positively says that competence with the concept of truth requires having inconsistent beliefs – so the 
inconsistency is rather more well-behaved. Third, the following reasoning bears considering. 
Compare a more standard view – a non-inconsistency view – on truth and logic in face of the liar 
with an inconsistency view. On the former kind of view the principles governing the truth predicate 
and the logical expressions will be rather more complicated than they are on the latter kind of view. 
The inconsistency theorist can say that that the principle governing the truth predicate is that it obey 
the standard truth rules and the principles governing the logical expressions are ordinary classical 
ones. Then ask: what is more convenient for practical purposes – the quick but dirty rules that in 
special situations lead to contradictions but in all normal situations are convenient, or rules 
guaranteed never to lead to contradictions but that tend to be more cumbersome? To properly make 
this argument one would of course need to compare simplicity of sets of rules in more detail. 
Moreover, how compelling the efficiency argument, as we can call the argument just sketched, is can 
certainly depend on the underlying conception of semantic rules. The argument works best when 
accompanying what I earlier called the psychological view. It appeals to efficiency in processing and 
only the psychological view immediately ties the rule talk to what is going on in actual processing. All 
I am doing here is to indicate how, when we are thinking of usefulness for practical purposes, there 
may be positive reasons to prefer an inconsistent concept of truth.  
                                                      
22 Again to stress, I am only concerned to lay out what my view is, not to provide a full defense of it. 
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The serious question concerns whether for certain theoretical or explanatory purposes, the 
concept of truth would need to be replaced. I have myself kept using the concept of truth in 
theorizing even while having deemed it inconsistent. By contrast, another inconsistency theorist, 
Scharp, has prominently argued that since the concept of truth is inconsistent it must be replaced, 
and he has devoted a good deal of attention to just what must replace it.23 
There are further distinctions to be drawn. Are we considering whether the ordinary concept 
of truth ought not to be used at this stage of inquiry, or are we considering whether at the ideal limit the 
ordinary concept ought not to be used? One possible view is that the inconsistency of the concept of 
truth is not such a serious defect that one cannot go on employing it, but still it is some sort of defect 
and at the ideal limit, the concept ought not to be used. One can agree with Scharp insofar as one 
thinks that the ordinary concept of truth ought not to be used at the ideal limit, and think it is an 
interesting question what an improved concept of truth might be like, even while one happily keeps 
using the ordinary concept at this stage of the game.   At any rate, I do not see what good argument 
there can be for thinking that a potentially viable inconsistency theory could have the consequence 
that the ordinary concept without question ought to be abandoned right away. The more reasonable 
question concerns whether the inconsistency theory implies that the concept of truth ought not to be 
used at the ideal limit, and the following remarks pertain primarily to that question. (One can think 
that the distinction just drawn trivializes the whole issue of replacement: if we are thinking about this 
stage of inquiry, it is obvious that a concept’s inconsistency need not mean that it ought to be 
replaced, but it is clear that a concept’s inconsistency means that it ought not to be used at the ideal 
limit.) 
I think it is clear that there is prima facie reason to suspect that a radical inconsistency 
theorist ought to favor replacing the concept of truth. But even moderate inconsistency theorists may 
feel the pressure to replace the concept – surely, it may be thought, we should not employ 
inconsistent concepts in our explanatory theories, even if these inconsistent concepts are relatively 
well behaved.  
However, there are complications. For example, take again the cognitivist justification for 
truth-theoretic semantics. I argued that given this justification, truth-theoretic semantics must employ 
a concept of truth already in use – if not the concept of truth expressed by a truth predicate of 
ordinary language then at least a concept of truth used by our minds in semantic processing. This 
puts pressure on any replacement idea, as noted. These considerations stand even given a radical 
version of the inconsistency view. In fact, in a number of papers Douglas Patterson has argued for 
the following combination of views: a speaker’s semantic competence consists in her ‘cognizing’, in 
                                                      
23 See especially Scharp (2013a) and (2013b). 
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Chomsky’s sense, the right truth theory, but an inconsistency view on truth is correct, so what she 
thereby cognizes is inconsistent.24 (In fact, Patterson’s view is a radical inconsistency view.) 
Patterson’s view highlights the fact that in presenting a theory given which competence consists in 
cognizing a truth theory, a theorist needn’t assert the theorems of the truth theory at issue. He says, 
e.g., 
 
To explain how people reason and interact with the world around them we ascribe cognition of 
or belief in theories, but we don’t think those theories have to be true. Why should it be any 
different when it comes to the semantics of the languages people speak?25 
 
Generally, and apart from truth theories, if some speakers employ a somehow defective expression 
or concept, a full account of their language or thought will have to describe that fact, and it will have 
to use that concept at least in descriptions of what the speakers say and think – but this does not 
mean that the theorist giving the account will need to, so to speak, make any uses of this expression 
her own. She need only mention it or make use of it in attitude ascriptions.  
Moreover, while the label “inconsistency” invites the reaction that if the concept of truth is 
inconsistent then it definitely ought to be replaced, at least for purposes of serious theorizing, many 
different things might be meant by calling the concept of truth inconsistent. Calling it inconsistent in 
one way or other involves saying that it is governed by inconsistent rules. But as discussed above, this 
rule talk can be cashed out in different ways. One thing that can be meant involves that anyone 
employing the concept of truth must have inconsistent beliefs. This is the belief view, from above. If 
this is what is meant, one could see why the inconsistency of the concept of truth would be a reason 
to replace it for theoretical purposes. But no other inconsistency view entails that users of the 
concept of truth must have inconsistent beliefs. The other inconsistency views – the different 
dispositions view, the normative view, and the psychological view – only entail that a user would 
have to have dispositions to form inconsistent beliefs, or would be prima facie entitled to 
inconsistent beliefs, or have internalized rules that allow for contradictions to be derived. None of 
these things is an immediate calamity; none of these things is immediately such that a theorist who 
                                                      
24 “Cognize” is originally Chomsky’s technical term, used by Chomsky to avoid what he saw as irrelevant 
complications pertaining to “know”. As often used, “cognize” is presumed to be factive, just as “know” is. I 
here follow Patterson in allowing that one can cognize what is in fact not true. Patterson says, e.g., 
“Understanding or ‘‘semantic competence’’ with respect to a natural language is agreement with others in 
theory cognized, not truth of that upon which there is agreement” (2009, p. 413). 
25 Patterson (2009), p. 412. Patterson goes on to say that all natural language sentences are meaningless, on the 
ground that the truth theory cognized by speakers doesn’t confer meanings on these sentences. That is a radical 
view, and seems like an extra, optional step.  
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finds herself in this position with one of the concepts she uses in a theoretical setting unquestionably 
must change her ways. 
On moderate versions of the inconsistency view, the inconsistent concept of truth can in 
principle stand for a relatively well-behaved property. This brings up another distinction having to do 
with replacement. One question will concern whether we should abandon the current concept for a 
different concept; a different question will concern whether we should avoid using any concept that 
stands for the property our actual concept stands for. A possible view is that the current inconsistent 
truth concept is to be avoided, but our theory will still have use for a concept of truth standing for 
the same property that our actual concept of truth stands for.26 
 
8. 
Scharp, who favors replacing the ordinary concept of truth given an inconsistency view, has argued 
against the way I have approached this matter and for replacing the concept of truth. He focuses on 
reference-determination: 
 
We also know that because  [the truth predicate of my theory] expresses an inconsistent 
concept, not all of its constitutive principles are true (or valid). Eklund does not tell us which of 
truth’s constitutive principles fail…The question is: how can  function properly in Eklund’s 
theory, which is supposed to provide a semantics for L, if some of its constitutive principles fail? 
Monoaletheism (i.e., no sentence is both true and false) is an essential principle for a non-
dialetheic semantics, and I do not see how a semantic theory could assign the right truth 
conditions to the sentences of L unless the truth predicate it employs obeys the ascending and 
descending truth rules…However, these are the very principles that give rise to the liar paradox. 
Thus, some of them have to fail…In sum, Eklund’s theory casts truth in a crucial explanatory 
role, and it implies that some of truth’s constitutive principles are untrue; however, it seems that 
if some of truth’s constitutive principles fail, then it is unsuited to play this explanatory role.27 
                                                      
26 In section 3, I outlined some problems concerning the replacement idea, having to do with the nature of the 
standard, cognitivist justification for truth-theoretic semantics. It seems that this justification demands that the 
concept of truth employed in semantic theory must be the same as that employed by ordinary speakers in 
semantic processing. I noted one possible way around this argument: maybe the concept used in semantic 
processing differs from the concept we have a word for in natural language, and it could be held that a concept 
of truth used in semantics must be the one actually used by speakers in semantic processing. In the context of 
discussion of inconsistency views it bears noting that it may be natural for an inconsistency theorist to hold that 
the concept of truth used in semantic processing shares the features of the concept expressed by the ordinary 
“true” by virtue of which the latter is inconsistent. In particular, there can be as much reason to hold that the 
ordinary truth rules are rules governing the former concept just as there is reason to hold that these rules are 
rules governing the latter concept.  For example, if the efficiency argument is a good argument it applies at least 
as convincingly to the concept of truth employed in semantic processing as to the lexicalized concept of truth.  
27 Scharp (2007), p. 613. 
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In the last sentence, Scharp appears to be saying that because the ordinary concept of truth is 
inconsistent, a theorist cannot legitimately use it in her metalanguage: he appears to say that because 
my theory implies that some of the constitutive principles for ‘true’ are untrue, I cannot legitimately 
assign to ‘true’ an explanatory role. General worries along these lines were dealt with in the previous 
section. However, the most important part of Scharp’s argument is independent of any general 
concerns about employing an inconsistent concept in a theoretical setting. It is that since the ordinary 
truth predicate cannot obey both the ascending and the descending truth rules, it is unsuitable to play 
the role in reference-determination that I assign to it. This point, whatever in the end is its fate, does 
not rely on the idea that inconsistent concepts cannot be cast in theoretical roles. One may worry 
that this point still cannot be correct since – in a classical setting28 – no predicate can obey these rules, 
and hence this cannot be a strike against the ordinary truth predicate. However, Scharp has a reply to 
this. His own preferred substitute for the ordinary concept of truth is a pair of predicates, one of 
which (“ascending true”) obeys the ascending truth rule and the other of which (“descending true”) 
obeys the descending truth rule: he thinks that in this roundabout way we can obey both truth rules. 
Still, the generality of the problem he raises must be emphasized: it arises for pretty much everyone. 
 Scharp does not say exactly why it is supposed to be necessary to employ a predicate that 
obeys the truth rules (or employ predicates that jointly obey the truth rules, as in the case of Scharp’s 
own theory). Burgess (ms) reconstructs Scharp’s argument as follows: 
 
Mainstream semantics derives its sentential meaning specifications from T-sentences. But 
Eklund thinks that not all T-sentences are true. He’s therefore faced with an embarrassing choice 
between inconsistent and “fragmentary” semantic theories. Take the T-sentence for the 
strengthened liar. If Eklund refrains from accepting this T-sentence (on pain of accepting its 
absurd classical consequences), then he’s forced to sit mute on the semantics of the strengthened 
liar. The problem isn’t so much that Eklund can’t “assign the right truth-conditions” to 
paradoxical sentences, as that he can’t consistently assign them truth conditions at all.29 
 
A first point to note about the argument thus reconstructed – a point Burgess makes – is that 
nothing in the Lewisian account of reference-determination forces me to think of a T-sentence as the 
canonical way of stating what the semantics of the strengthened liar sentence is. All that I am 
committing myself to is the claim that the extension and antiextension of the truth predicate are 
                                                      
28 And recall that throughout I am setting aside the possibility of revising logic. 
29 Burgess (ms), p. 11. 
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determined in the Lewisian way; there is no need for this to go via T-sentences.30 So even if I cannot 
accept the T-sentence for the strengthened liar, that does not force me to be silent about its 
semantics.  
However, Scharp’s argument still raises an interesting issue. Suppose, e.g., that we are 
operating with a truth predicate that doesn’t obey the descending truth rule. What the machinery of 
reference-determination churns out are things like that such-and-such a sentence S of the object 
language is true. But unless one can rely on the descending truth rule in full generality, one cannot 
always infer from this to S – and as far as language use is concerned, the basic question is whether or 
not to utter S. So A machinery of reference determination that churned out things of the form S is T 
would be more useful in this regard if T obeyed the descending truth rule, for otherwise S cannot be 
concluded. 
However, to the extent that the type of consideration just presented is taken as decisive 
when it comes to what truth predicate to employ, we are treating the truth predications instrumentally. 
We are thinking of ‘S is T’ judgments merely as means to the end of concluding S. This is the way of 
thinking associated with deflationism. Another way of thinking emphasizes the importance of 
whichever property ‘T’ stands for: e.g., we are concerned with whether S is true not just as a means 
to figuring out whether to judge or assert that S, but because it matters, for purposes of thinking 
about language, whether S is true. The distinction is easy to overlook, because we are so accustomed 
to moving freely between S and “S is true”. But in contexts where it is salient that the truth predicate 
may fail to obey both truth rules, the distinction becomes important. 
I will not here attempt to decide between the two outlooks. But I do want to relate all this to 
Scharp, who as mentioned is the inconsistency theorist who has taken the question of the 
replacement of truth the most seriously. Scharp argues for employment of his pair of predicates, 
expressing ascending truth and descending truth, on the ground that it is these predicates together 
that do the best job, in a classical setting, of performing the tasks of endorsement and rejection 
associated with the truth predicate; and he argues that the costs of abandoning classical logic are too 
high. He thinks that because his pair of predicates has this virtue, this pair should play the role 
otherwise assigned to the concept of truth in semantics. But how does Scharp conceive of this role, 
such that the virtues of his pair of predicates are virtues as far as playing truth’s theoretical role in 
semantics is concerned? Scharp does not actually say much about this. The closest he comes to 
having an extended discussion of the role of truth is in ch. 7 of his (2013b), where he presents a 
Davidson-inspired appeal to measurement theory. The discussion is however so abstract that it is not 
                                                      
30 Burgess’ article is mainly devoted to dealing with another complication: when I appeal to Lewisian ideas 
regarding reference-determination I make essential use of the ordinary concept of truth when arguing for the 
legitimacy of this concept, and one might think there is a worrisome kind of circularity there. While taking this 
worry seriously, Burgess presents a reply to it. 
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clear what amounts to truth conceived of as correct measurement. But based on the foregoing, I can 
make some remarks. Scharp can hardly accept any version of the cognitivist justification for truth-
theoretic semantics. That would presuppose that what ordinary speakers have tacit knowledge of 
involves the concepts of ascending and descending truth, and this claim seems rather implausible, 
and besides, Scharp’s reasoning in favor of his pair of predicates does not proceed by way of 
considering what ordinary speakers can be held to have tacit knowledge of. But for a deflationist, 
Scharp’s proposal may well look attractive. All that the deflationist looks for in a truth predicate is 
the ability to perform an expressive role, and Scharp’s team of predicates is designed to perform this 
role. 
Generally, it is natural to want a truth predicate to obey the standard truth rules. But it must 
be asked where the demand that it obey these rules comes from. One source of the demand is the 
conviction that the ordinary truth predicate obeys the truth rules. This is problematized by the liar 
reasoning. And at any rate, questions about what the ordinary truth predicate is like must be 
distinguished from questions about what we should want a truth predicate to be like for theoretical 
purposes. Another source of the demand is precisely the sense that it is important for theoretical 
purposes that a truth predicate obey these truth rules. And no doubt there are expressive benefits, of 
the kind prominently emphasized by deflationists, to having a truth predicate obeying these rules. An 
important question is what not merely expressive purposes there are for which a truth predicate 
needs to obey these rules. Maybe there are such purposes, but Scharp does not make clear which 
such purposes he might have in mind. 
When explicitly considering deflationism, in (2013b), Scharp is actually fairly negative. He 
insists that truth has an “explanatory role”, something the deflationist denies, and that it is because 
truth has this explanatory role that deflationism is inadequate. But again, when one looks at the role 
Scharp himself allots to truth, it is as a device for endorsement and rejection; and the deflationist too 
emphasizes that truth has that role. I think it is misleading to call that role “explanatory”, but that is 
another matter.  
 
9. 
What I have been concerned with here is what the case might be for replacing the ordinary concept 
of truth by some other truth-like concept for the purposes of theoretical projects related to language. 
Before closing I ought also to mention, briefly, the question of whether there is a case for 
replacement when it comes to projects that do not immediately pertain to the study of natural 
language. Some such projects may be found in logic or metamathematics. Then there are questions 
about things like the aim of inquiry. Sometimes truth is thought of as the, or an, aim of inquiry – but 
maybe it is not the ordinary concept of truth but a replacement concept that stands for the proper 
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aim of inquiry? Let me just briefly remark on one difficulty for this idea. If we try to imagine a 
community whose members aim to judge that p not when p is true but when p is true* (where 
truth*truth), are we not really imagining a community that judges something with a different 
content, that p*, instead of that p? After all, somehow or other – with details to be filled in 
depending on which theory of content one prefers – the content of a judgment  somehow depends 
on use and the judgment’s relations to the world, and this community’s judgments of the relevant 
kind are correlated with it being the case that p* and not with it being the case that p. (Let me 
illustrate this using an especially stark example. Suppose we want to say that they aim to judge that p 
when p is false. Then they will make the relevant judgments when we in the corresponding situation 
would judge that not-p. Do they not then judge that not-p instead of judging that p?) But if so, such a 
community seems not to be possible. And if a community operating with a different truth-like norm 
than a norm of ordinary truth is not possible, then it is not possible to have an aim of inquiry other 
than truth. Obviously there is much more to be said here. I am only very briefly indicating some of 
the difficulties for this other project of replacing truth.31 
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